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As the EU Said at the NATO Summit 
Sven Biscop 
The May 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago 
will see the first results of the new attempt 
to make Europeans more capable militarily. 
Having decided last December on projects 
addressing some of the key shortfalls, the 
EU  has  a  unique  opportunity  to  deliver  a 
strong message – if projects become reality. 
The European Council can be the tool, and 
its President the voice, of a strong collective 
effort. 
In  December  2010,  the  EU  launched  the 
“Ghent Framework” for Pooling & Sharing of 
military capabilities. A few months later, at the 
February 2011 Munich Security Conference, the 
NATO  Secretary-General  followed  suit  and 
announced Smart Defence.  
 
The  genesis  of  the  two  processes  is  closely 
linked. Pooling & Sharing emerged as a way of 
addressing the absence of coordination between 
Member States under financial pressure cutting 
defence budgets, while circumventing the dead-
locked  debate  about  Permanent  Structured 
Cooperation. Smart Defence was very much a 
NATO  reaction  to  the  dynamic  thus  initially 
generated  in  the  CSDP.  At  the  top  political 
level,  the  beauty  contest  between  the  two 
remains as intense as ever…  
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The  two  processes  pursue  similar  aims 
through similar ways – and both struggle with 
a lack of means. In times of austerity, the aim 
is to do more with less: stimulating Europeans 
to  pool  their  efforts,  enhancing  cost-
effectiveness, in order to maintain and upgrade 
relevant capabilities, but also to undertake new 
capability  initiatives  addressing  the  strategic 
shortfalls in the European arsenal.  
 
The aims are quite ambitious therefore – more 
so perhaps than some of the Member States 
concerned care to know. But they have to be. 
The  Libya  campaign  once  again  highlighted 
the  well-known  European  deficiencies, 
especially as concerns strategic enablers – 90% 
of which had to be provided by the US. And 
the latter have now repeatedly made it clear (in 
Defence  Secretary  Robert  Gates’  Brussels 
farewell  speech  of  10  June  2011,  and  most 
recently  in  the  January  2012  Sustaining  US 
Global  Leadership:  Priorities  for  21
st  Century 
Defense)  that  in  the  future  they  expect 
Europeans  to  take  charge  of  crises  in  their 
own neighbourhood on their own.  
 
Thus  Pooling  &  Sharing/Smart  Defence 
cannot just be about preserving the capabilities 
that Europeans have – it is about getting more.  
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SMART POOLING?  
In an essentially Member State-driven process, 
capitals  proposed  opportunities  for  new 
cooperative schemes, on which the European 
Defence Agency (EDA) and Allied Command 
Transformation (ACT) built to generate project 
proposals  in  the  most  promising  areas. 
Excellent  informal  staff-to-staff  contacts 
ensured  that  work  on  both  sides  was 
coordinated  to  a  much  greater  extent  than 
before, and de-conflicted as much as possible. 
Each  process  yielded  hundreds  of  potential 
projects, yet each somehow left the proponents 
of a major leap forward wanting. Of course, the 
mass of proposed projects were all positive in 
themselves, but overall there was a certain lack 
of ambition.  
 
On the EU-side, Pooling & Sharing started the 
only  way  an  ambitious  collective  endeavour 
can, potentially, work: as a political initiative of 
the combined EU Ministers of Defence. Up to 
each Minister in his/her country then to, in a 
top-down  manner,  steer  national  defence 
planning  in  the  direction  agreed  upon  with 
his/her colleagues. In all too many countries, 
follow-up appeared lacklustre however and the 
national  defence  apparatus  was  left  much 
leeway.  Predictably  enough,  this  was  used  to 
slow down the integrative dynamic created at 
the  political  level.  This  was  the  case  in 
Germany  especially,  although  it  had  been 
instrumental  in  launching  the  Ghent 
Framework – a rare but welcome example of 
Germany acting as an engine of the CSDP. The 
focus of the key Member States in the military 
field, France and the UK, was on their bilateral 
cooperation and so they did not initially assume 
a driving role.  
 
Even more than before, as defence budgets are 
under  heavy  pressure  across  Europe, 
contributing  to  new  collective  capability 
projects  is  only  possible  by  cutting  national 
capabilities.  Member  States  fear  contributing 
too  much  of  their  limited  budgets  to  a 
collective capability as compared to the extent 
to which they expect to have to draw on it, and 
invoke  sovereignty  to  resist  pooling  even  of 
existing  capabilities.  This  reluctance  is 
understandable,  but  not  justifiable.  Many  of 
the  national  capabilities  that  conservative-
minded defence establishments cling to, to the 
detriment of new programmes, are in fact not 
capabilities at all, for they cannot be employed 
for  any  expeditionary  operation.  The 
sovereignty  thus  protected  is  largely  illusory: 
without  usable  capabilities,  national 
governments have full freedom of inaction. By 
contrast, the examples of EATC and Admiral 
Benelux  prove  that  far-reaching  yet  flexible 
pooling is perfectly reconcilable with maximal 
sovereignty.  Pooling  in  reality  increases 
sovereignty,  empowering  Member  States  to 
operate at levels and in capability areas which 
on their own they could never hope to achieve.  
 
SHARED DEFENCE?  
As  Pooling  &  Sharing  fizzled  out,  Smart 
Defence  kicked  in  and  gave  new  impetus  to 
the same process in a different organization – 
which soon went the same way.  
 
An  indispensable  (though  not  in  itself 
sufficient)  condition  for  a  NATO  capability 
project to work is that the US contribute, with 
money,  personnel,  and  equipment.  Then  the 
European  Allies  can  be  convinced  to  put  in 
their  share.  For  the  US,  the  point  of  Smart 
Defence  however  is  exactly  the  opposite:  to 
convince the Europeans to solve the European 
capability problem, without American support. 
Why would the US pay for, say, European air-
to-air  refuelling  capacity  of  which  it  has  an 
abundance already when its defence budget is 
undergoing  a  major  cut?  (Even  so 
“abundance” remains an apt term to describe 
the US budget when compared with the rest of 
the world). The aim is for Europeans to pay 
for  a  European  capacity,  not  simply  to  “do   3 
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more stuff together”, but to acquire their own 
enablers,  thus  allowing  US  capacity  to  be 
diverted  elsewhere  –  that  would  be  true 
burden-sharing. Therefore the prerequisite for 
the US to safely shift their strategic focus from 
Europe’s  neighbourhood  to  the  Asia-Pacific 
and  redeploy  their  means  accordingly,  is 
European strategic autonomy, at least regionally.  
 
Rather than an American threat, this strategic 
shift is a desire, which is partly dependent on 
Europe’s ability to defend itself. If Europe were 
seriously  threatened,  the  US  would  have  no 
choice but to intervene because of its own vital 
interests.  In  that  sense,  the  US  remains  a 
European  power.  European  capitals,  all  too 
well aware of this, ignore at their peril however 
that the US might decide to make the point by 
withholding  its  military  support  for  a  crisis 
management  operation  of  importance  to 
Europeans without threatening vital interests – 
like  Libya.  Meanwhile  however,  absent 
American  money,  European  enthusiasm  for 
Smart  Defence  began  to  ebb  once  concrete 
projects,  and  therefore  budgets,  had  to  be 
defined.  Just  like  the  Defence  Capabilities 
Initiative  and  the  Prague  Capabilities 
Commitment before it.  
 
On  the  face  of  it,  the  US  is  now  more 
supportive  than  ever  of  European  military 
cooperation. But old ways die hard and certain 
American  attitudes  continue  in  reality  to 
undermine it.  
 
Unlike the Cold War era, European Allies no 
longer  have  the  scale  to  generate  significant 
new  national  capabilities,  certainly  not  in  the 
field of strategic enablers, hence the need for 
collective initiatives. Logically, a new collective 
level will have to be introduced into the NATO 
Defence  Planning  Process:  instead  of  dealing 
only with individual Allies, it will have to take 
into  account  collective  targets  and 
contributions by the European Allies. The need 
for  both  European  strategic  autonomy  and  a 
collective European defence planning level: is 
not  the  evident  conclusion  that  this  level 
already exists – we call it the CSDP? Yet for the 
moment the US appears reticent to put two and 
two  together,  for  fear  of  losing  the  initiative 
and leadership over the process. The European 
autonomy  which  their  new  strategy  requires 
cannot be achieved however without a platform 
for European coordination, for which NATO 
is  not  now  configured.  How  else  can 
Europeans  decide  on  capability  priorities, 
which  are  a  function  of  their  interests  and 
foreign policy priorities – which if and when 
they  define  them  collectively  they  do  so 
through the EU? The natural US desire to steer 
everything  through  NATO  at  28,  because  it 
allows Washington to steer the decisions of the 
Europeans,  now  stands  in  the  way  of  US 
strategy.  
 
Similarly, US industrial interests risk getting in 
the way of the wider strategic objective. In the 
corridors  of  Brussels  it  is  called  “Pooling  & 
Charging”:  the  use  of  Smart  Defence  to 
stimulate  Europeans  to  fill  their  shortfalls 
through pooling – to buy American equipment. 
But  this  only  serves  to  reinforce  the  existing 
divides among Europeans. Reluctance to invest 
in  collective  projects  being  considerable 
already,  those  Europeans  with  defence 
industrial  interests  will  certainly  not  be 
convinced  by  the  prospect  of  equipping 
Europe with American enablers. Those without 
a  significant  defence  industry  might  be  so 
enticed,  but  without  participation  of  the 
former,  they  lack  the  critical  mass  to  acquire 
enablers  at  the  level  required  for  European 
autonomy. Continued fragmentation will be the 
logical result. Europe risks ending up without 
an  autonomous  Defence  Industrial  and 
Technological  Base.  Are  the  Member  States 
without  significant  defence  industry  today 
certain  that  then  their  interests  will  be  better 
served? And is the US certain that then in the   4 
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long term Europeans will always buy American 
– rather than Indian, Brazilian…?  
 
In short, European strategic autonomy in terms 
of  capabilities  can  neither  exist  without 
autonomy  in  terms  of  strategy-making  nor 
without defence-industrial autonomy.  
 
ON  TO  CHICAGO:  ENTER  THE  EUROPEAN 
COUNCIL  
At the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012 a 
first assessment of the results and prospects of 
Smart  Defence  is  expected,  as  of  Pooling  & 
Sharing, for the EU is invited as such. On the 
NATO-side  in  particular  there  is  a  search  for 
“flagship projects” substantial enough to present 
to the Heads of State and Government. The EU 
should  not  necessarily  follow  the  NATO 
calendar – unless it has something to say.  
 
And indeed it has. On 1 December 2011 already, 
the  EU’s  Foreign  Affairs  Council  welcomed 
Member  States’  commitments  to  11  “specific 
concrete projects” (8 new, 3 based on existing 
initiatives) facilitated by the EDA. They are the 
result of the new drive prevalent in the EDA, 
and  from  the  initiative  of  specific  Member 
States, among others France and Italy. French 
industrial interests undoubtedly play a role, but 
the  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  these  projects 
directly  address  some  of  the  key  shortfalls  in 
terms  of  enablers,  among  others:  air-to-air 
refuelling,  smart  munitions,  intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance including space 
situational  awareness,  and  military  satellite 
communications. It is now crucial therefore that 
follow-up  is  ensured  and  a  critical  mass  of 
Member States recruited to make sure that these 
key projects will be implemented.  
 
Promising  these  projects  certainly  are.  So 
promising in fact that the US have proposed to 
merge  certain  Pooling  &  Sharing  and  Smart 
Defence  initiatives  into  a  common  flagship 
project.  Better  proof  of  the  CSDP  projects’ 
potential  there  could  not  be,  nor  of  the 
difficulties NATO is facing to arrive at equally 
promising proposals. For the time being, the 
projects  listed  under  the  heading  of  Smart 
Defence  are  all  useful,  but  none  is 
consequential enough to merit the “flagship” 
label. As the capability problem NATO faces 
is a European one, it is probably logical that it 
proved more easy to find (the beginnings of) a 
solution  among  Europeans,  through  CSDP. 
There is no need for Schadenfreude or envy on 
the  part  of  the  respective  bureaucracies 
though.  What  counts  is  that  the  European 
Member States, at the service of which both 
the  CSDP  and  NATO  are,  have  agreed  on 
what could be the first step towards a major 
enhancement of Europe’s capabilities.  
 
Could be – for this to materialize, disturbance 
must be avoided and follow-up ensured.  
 
The US must avoid disturbing and potentially 
fatally undermining the still modest European 
dynamic in function of industrial interests. Its 
bid  to  create  a  common  air-to-air  refuelling 
project  using  American  equipment  is  an 
example  of  how  the  “Pooling  &  Charging” 
attitude  can  be  counter-productive. 
Objectively,  Washington  should  welcome  a 
European initiative in an area in which in the 
Libyan  crisis  Europeans  were  almost  wholly 
dependent on US assets. Its idea of a common 
American-equipped Pooling & Sharing/Smart 
Defence project risks dividing the Europeans 
with the result that neither project reaches the 
critical mass to generate a substantial capability 
increase – and burden-sharing will remain an 
illusion. Furthermore it is especially prone to 
create bad blood as it comes in the wake of the 
US  cancelling  a  major  air-to-air  refuelling 
contract with Northrop Grumman/EADS in 
favour  of  Boeing,  on  grounds  which  are 
contentious to say the least.  
   5 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
Europe must ensure through quick and concrete 
follow-up  that  the  momentum  is  not  lost. 
Europeans must adopt “Pooling & Charging” – 
they must charge ahead and pool their efforts to 
make the announced projects a reality. Just like 
launching  the  Ghent  Framework  itself,  this 
requires  collective  and  top-down  political 
decision-making. Only the top political leaders 
of  the  Member  States  have  the  authority  to 
order their defence establishments to make this 
happen,  by  reorienting  both  investments  and 
cuts  in  function  of  the  need  to  participate  in 
collective projects. Perhaps the time has come to 
lift  defence  up  to  the  level  of  the  European 
Council, which until now has never taken charge 
of the CSDP. Under its President, Herman Van 
Rompuy, the European Council has started the 
practice of preparing the key summits between 
the EU and the great powers. Is not the NATO 
Summit  such  an  occasion?  Putting  Pooling  & 
Sharing on the agenda of the European Council 
prior to Chicago would create the best chance of 
starting a political dynamic that would stimulate 
sufficient Member States to sign up to one or 
more of the key projects. Even if not all of the 
27 would be able and willing to join in now, it 
could create the critical mass for each individual 
project to start for real.  
 
Thus a unique opportunity would be created for 
Mr. Van Rompuy to deliver a strong message in 
Chicago  on  behalf  of  the  EU:  these  are  the 
strategic enablers which through these collective 
projects  EU  Member  States  have  decided t o  
acquire.  
 
CONCLUSION: DEFENCE IN 3D 
Many might instinctively draw back before what 
they  see  as  the  dreaded  “European  caucus” 
within  the  Alliance.  Yet  this  evolution  is 
inevitable,  for  unless  they  do  so  collectively, 
Europeans  do  not  have  the  means  to  address 
their capability shortfalls. It is but logical that it 
proves  slightly  easier  to  solve  a  European 
problem among Europeans in the framework 
that was purpose-built to that end: the CSDP. 
And  though  not  all  EU  Member  States  are 
NATO  Allies:  is  this  not  the  era  of  NATO 
partnerships,  of  working  closely  with  non-
members?  
 
More  importantly,  capability  development 
through  the  CSDP  and  NATO  is  100% 
compatible. Capabilities developed by Member 
States  with  the  EDA  or  NATO  acting  as 
facilitator can be deployed in any framework. 
NATO  remains  the  forum  to  initiate  those 
programmes  to  which  Europeans  and 
Americans  want  to  contribute  together.  The 
new  collective  targets  and  capabilities  which 
Europeans set and create among themselves, 
through  the  CSDP,  can  be  incorporated  as 
such in NATO defence planning. The aim is 
not  for  all  European  Member  States  to 
contribute to all projects. European capabilities 
will remain a complex puzzle of national and 
multinational  capabilities.  In  some 
multinational areas, pooling will take place in 
several clusters of a few Member States each; 
in others, requiring a larger critical mass, there 
will probably be just one capability constituted 
by a dozen or more Member States.  
 
To manage this puzzle and make sure that in 
the end the sum of it all produces a coherent 
set  of  European  capabilities,  tactical-level 
coordination  of  cooperation,  project-by-
project,  will  not  suffice.  In  fact,  both  the 
Ghent  Framework  and  Smart  Defence 
explicitly  call  for  a  three-dimensional 
approach. Besides (1) pooling or Cooperation, 
on which both processes now focus, there is a 
need to decide (2) which capabilities are to be 
maintained in the first place or Prioritization, 
and (3) which capabilities will be provided by 
role-  and  task-sharing  or  Specialization.  This 
can  only  be  achieved  if  the  Member  States 
willing to contribute complement the current   6   
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project-by-project  approach  with  strategic-level 
coordination of national defence planning as a 
whole.  
 
Only a permanent and structured dialogue at the 
political  level,  between  the  EU  Ministers  of 
Defence,  can  produce  transparency,  certainty 
and  confidence.  That  will  allow  the  Ministers 
each  to  effectively  and  convincingly  instruct 
their  Chief  of  Defence:  to  focus  the  national 
defence effort on a reduced range of employable 
capabilities;  to  scrap  redundant  capabilities,  of 
which there are far too many in Europe today; 
and  to  use  the  full  potential  for  cluster-based 
pooling; thus to create budgetary space to invest 
in the major new collective projects to acquire 
strategic  enablers.  In  this  strategic  dialogue 
between national defence planning lies the true 
added value of the CSDP. All concerned would 
be wise to encourage it.  
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